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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MONNA McBROOM,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 9'702

HOWARD KIRTLEY
McBROOM,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for divorce, award of custody
of the minor children of the parties, property, alimony and support money.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court. From a decree
awarding defendant the divorce on his counterclaim and plaintiff $1.00 per year alimony, an·d
awarding plaintiff custody of the two minor children, the property of the parties, $200.00 per month
support money, ~and $750.00 attorneys fees, defendant appeals.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal as a matter of law
of that part of the decree awarding plaintiff custody of the two minor children, the property of the
parties, $200.00 per month support money, $750.00
attorneys fees and $1.00 per year alimony.
STATEMENT OF FAC·T'S
A preliminary statement is necessary to understand the circumstances giving rise to this divorce
action.
'Plaintiff fraudulently commenced this action
on August 25, 1961, by swearing to 'and filing a
verified complaint, Which plaintiff admitted at trial
was false, and having a restraining order issued,
and defendant moved out of his home. (R. 1-9, 286289, 395, 461.)
Pl'aintiff, prior to commencement of the action,
had been guilty of a great many indiscretions and,
in particular, had persistently disappeared from the
home of th·e parties and stayed out all night. (R.
1'99-310, 444-457.) Defendant, nevertheless, in order
to protect his home and family, sought a reconciliation, and without the aid of counsel personally
entered into a stipulation with plaintiff's attorney,
Leland S. Mc-Cullough, under which the hearing on
the restraining order was continued witho~t date
and defendant moved back into the home. (R. 10,
456-4'57.)
2
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The reconciliation was not successful. (R 292320, 457-469.) On January 15, 1962, defendant discovered in a desk in his eight year old son's bedroom
a diary, in the form of a little black book (Ex. 2),
written in plaintiff's shorthand and certain miscellaneous shorthand notes (Exs. 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12,
18, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 26) written by plaintiff. Defendant submitted the diary and shorthand notes
to his attorneys and caused the same to be translated by a shorthand expert, Mr. Clair Johnson.
(R. 320-322, 339-340, 436-438.) Defendant thereupon discovered for the first time that from May
19, 1961, down through and after commencement
of this action on August 25, 1961, plaintiff, unbeknown to defendant, been carrying on an immoral
and adulterous relationship with a married ma.n,
who resides in Salt Lake County with his wife and
three ~hildren. (R. 199-310,237-239, 270.) The man's
name was Bertram Jarvis. (R. 211.) He was employed as a truck driver for the telephone company.
(R. 276.) Defendant further discovered for the
first time that at the height of her affair with Jarvis
plaintiff had deliberately set out in her own handwriting a design, scheme and plan to con1n1ence this
divorce action and take from defendant his home,
his children and his livelihood (Exs. 6, 18, R. 214219, 269, 286-287.) and that plaintiff at the time had
admitted in her own handwriting that her motive
3
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in so doing was not because of misconduct on the
part of defendant but because of her relationships
1
wi th J·arvis. (Ex. 23, R. 268, 286-288, 315-318, 341342.)
Defendant thereupon engaged Gordon I. Hyde
of the law firm of McBroom & Hyde to represent
him in the trial of this action and, for the purpose
of obtaining an immediate and speedy trial, entered
into a stipulation dated January 31, 1962 (R. 11-12,
198, 477), which stipulation provided the following: that pending the trial defendant would move
out of the home; that defendant should have the
right to visit the minor children in the home and
out of the home at all reasonable times; that the
fact that defendant so moved out of the home and
entered into the stipulation should be without prejudice to the rights of defendant, and in particular,
should not be construed by the parties or the court
as an admission by defendant that plaintiff was a
fit and proper person to have the care and custody
of the minor children for any period of time and
should not be construed as ,an admission by defendant that plaintiff had any right or justification for having defendant move out of the home;
that plaintiff would forthwith file an amended complaint; and that, upon defendant's filing a responsive pleading, the case would be immediately set
down for trial without a pretrial hearing.
4
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The following statement of facts is, except
where otherwise indicated, predicated on plaintiff's
admissions and plaintiff's shorthand notes contained
in her diary (Ex. 2) and translations thereof by
plaintiff on the witness stand and the miscellaneous
shorthand notes written by plaintiff with translations attached as testified to and corrected by plaintiff on the witness stand (Exs. 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12,
18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26 and 27, R. 199-310.)
The parties were married ten years before trial
on April 13, 1952. (R. 15, 13, 413.) Prior to the
marriage defendant had no indication that plaintiff
was an immo~al or obscene person. (R. 414.)
There were two children born to the marriage,
Howard Kirtley McBroom, Jr., age 8, referred to
in the record as "Kirt" and Elizabeth McBroom,
age 6, referred to in the record as "Lisa". (R. 15,
t2, 175.)
Throughout the marriage Mr. McBroom had
been employed as a salesman and during the four
years prior to trial was an agent for Equitable Life
Assurance Society at Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 411.)
The parties got along fairly well during the
first four years of the marriage until after the birth.
of the child, Lisa, in 1955. Defendant testified, that
commencing in the year, 1956, and continuing thereafter throughout the marriage, plaintiff periodically disappeared from the home of the parties and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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returned·late at night under the influence of. alcohol
and. without satisfactory explanation :and that during this period plaintiff refused to participate in
activities of the family with the minor children.
(R. 432-433.) Plaintiff on rebuttal generally dened this and, in particular, testified that she did
not .disappear from the home and refuse to engage
in activities with the family in May and June of
1961. (R. 533-534, 546.) In this plaintiff perjured
herself. Plaintiff had previously admitted on crossexamination that she had repeatedly and persistently disappeared from the home to consort with Jarvis
during June of 1961, and continuing thereafter
until the commencement of this action and that during this period she had persistently failed to engage
in activities with the family. (R. 199-310).
On May 19, 1961, plaintiff, unbeknown to defendant, met Bert Jarvis in the 9th South Grand
Central Market. (R. 213, 226.) She noted the fact
in her diary and that Jarvis told her he would call
her later. ( R. 226.) She also wrote a shortliand
note, dated May 19, 1961, (Ex. 9, R. 227-229) in
which she again noted that Jarvis said he would
call her and that she hoped he would.
Thereafter on June 1, 1961, Jarvis telephoned
plaintiff and made an appointment to n1eet her on
the following day at a barroom, referred to in the
diary as the O'ld Zang, now known as the Blue
6
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Angel. (R. 234.) Plaintiff met Jarvis at the Blue
Angel on the following day, June 2. (R. 234.) Plaintiff and defendant had previously arranged to take
their two children to Lagoon on the next day, Saturday, June 3, ( R. 34, 235, 446.) Instead plaintiff,
\Vhile she was consorting with Jarvis in ·the Blue
Angel, made an engagement to meet him on Saturday in a park. ( R. 234.) On Saturday, June 3, plaintiff went and stayed with Jarvis ( R. 235) and
plaintiff's husband took the children to Lagoon
alone. ( R. 235, 446.)
From this time on through the months of June,
July and August and after the commencement of
this divorce action on August 25, 1961, into September of 1961, plaintiff was in daily contact with
Jarvis either in person or by telephone and repeatedly and persistently left her home, her minor
children and the defendant to consort with Jarvis.
(R. 199-338.)
During this period plaintiff repeatedly and persistently frequented barrooms with Jarvis in Salt
Lake City and, in particular, establishments known
as the Pecan, located under a hotel on West Temple
and Third South Streets, the 451 Club, located on
South West Temple, the Indigo and the Blue Angel.
Plaintiff consorted with Jarvis in these establishments in the day time and at night until such hours
as 1:00 A.M. (R. 204-205, 221, 234, 240, 247, 1997
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310.) On substantially every occasion that plaintiff
and Jarvis were together they drank alcoholic bever.ages. Plaintiff noted in her shorthand note following a meeting with Jarvis on September 10, 19'61,
that it was the first time they had been together
without drinking and that she found it, "very dull."
(Ex. 24, R. 304, 199-310.)
Plaintiff repeatedly and persistently stayed out
all night with Jarvis until such hours as 2 :00 A.M.,
2:30 A.M., 3:00 A.M., 3:30 A.M., 5:00 A.M., and
8:00 A.M. (R. 204, 274, 281-283, 2·9'2.) On such
occasions plaintiff admitted that she stayed with
J'arvis in barrooms, supra, p. 7, in 'his home in
Kearns while his family was away, in an apartment
on the west side, and in canyons in parked automo'biles. (R. 205, 241, 248, 294, 284, 301-303.)
Pl!aintiff denied that she and Jarvis were committing adultery. (R. 201, 353.) The evidence to
the contrary is conclusive.
(1) On July 14, 1961, plain'tiff picked Jarvis
up sometime after 4 :30 P.M., they drank in barrooms, then stayed out all 11ight, and she didn't get
home until 8:00 o'clock the next morning. Plaintiff noted in her diary on July 19, 1961, that she
met Jarvis at 8 :20 P.M., they went to a barroom
and on this occasion she was, "a good girl". (R.
209.) Plaintiff noted in her diary on August 3, 1961,
that she met Jarvis at 7 :00 P.M., they went to a
8
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barroom, that she didn't get home until 3:00 A.M.,
and that she, "was bad again." ( R. 27 4.)
(2) Defendant testified that he did not have
marital relations with plaintiff from sometime prior
to the first time plaintiff stayed out all night on
July 14, 1961, until the time of the attempted reconciliation following the commencement of the divorce
action. ( R. 453, 459.) Defendant further testified
that in July of 1961, pl·aintiff commenced sleeping
alone. ( R. 453, 4'59, 461.) In August of 1961 defendant discovered that his wife was using chemical
contraceptives. ( R. 453-454.) Plaintiff admitted
that she commenced using contraceptives in August
of 1961, and explained on the witness sta,nd that
she dild so because she was having marital relations
with her husband. ( R. 550.) On July 22 and July
23, 1961, plaintiff wrote shorthand notes (Exs. 6
& 7) in which she set forth the following with reference to her relationships with her husband: "'He is
no longer your husband. You are no longer his wife.
* * * Move out of the bedroom. Move Kirt into
the bedroom with him as soon as possible. * * *
From now on I will consider myself divorced. I
will not live with you as a wife. * * * I will live my
own life, coming and going as I decide and in effect
acting as though I am a divorcee. * * * Sleep in
your own bed." (R. 214-216.) These notes were
written within one week after an occasion when
9
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plaintiff stayed out all night with Jarvis, supTa.
p. 8-9. It is apparent that defendant was not h·aving s~xual relations with his wife and that plaintiff's testimony was perjured.
(3) Plaintiff kept a menstrual chart in 1961
(Ex. 21) on which she kept a detailed record of
her periods of menstruation during the year, 1961.
She noted on the menstrual chart the following,
"S·tarted 5/19/61. 45 minutes. 9th South Grand
Central. Ended 9-10-61. What a year!!" (Ex. 21,
R. 306-309.) May 19, 1961, was the first occasion
on which plaintiff met Jarvis. (R. 213, 226, 306309.) September 10, 1961, was the last date on
which plaintiff admitted consorting with Jarvis.
( R. 303-304.) If plaintiff was not comrnitting adultery with Jarvis, there was no occasion for her to
make these notations on her menstrual chart.
Plaintiff admitted that she repeatedly and persistently lied to defendant as to her whereabouts
:and activities and by the use of artifice and intrigue
with Jarvis kept her relationship from the knowledge of defendant. ( R. 248, 271, 283, 299.)
Plaintiff testified that, during her nightly escapades with Jarvis, she either left the children with
baby tenders or with her husband and that, in any
event, she was not worried about them because her
husba.nd was a good father and took care of them.
( R. 205, 234-235, 250, 273.) Defendant testified
10
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that he repeatedly came home at night after work
and found the children left with young baby tenders
and that his wife had left no information with the
baby tenders as to her whereabouts or provision
for care of the children in case of difficulty or emergency. (R. 449, 454, 457, 462.) Plaintiff admitted
in a shorthand note written July 22, 1961, at the
height of her escapades with Jarvis, that she was
giving the impression that she wanted her children
to sleep eighteen hours a day and th~at she was so
busy with all of her "responsibilities" that she did
not have time to answer her children's questions.
(Ex. 6, R. 217, 218.)
During the period plaintiff repeatedly and persistently refused and neglected to engage in activities with her children so that she could consort
with Jarvis. Typical examples are the following.
On Saturday, June 3, 1961, plaintiff, pursuant to
a prior appointment, consorted with Jarvis instead
of going to Lagoon with her husband and children
as the family had previously planne'd. ( R. 2'34-235,
446.) On Friday, July 14, 1'9'61, defendant's employer, Equitalble Life Assurance Society, was giving an outing for its employees and their wives and
children at Lagoon. On Thursday, July 13, 1961,
plaintiff invited Jarvis to meet her on the 14th because her husband and children would be at Lagoon.
Thereafter on July 14th defendant took the children
11
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to the outing alone and plaintiff met Jarvis at approximately 4:30 P.M., drank with him in barrooms
and staye'd out with him all night. (R. 203-204,
449.) On ·sunday, September 10, 1961, plaintiff went
!and conso~ted with Jarvis in an apartment in which
he was staying on the west side in Salt Lake City.
(R. 303.) On cross examination plaintiff was asked
where the children were in the meantime. She replied that they were in church with her husband,
Howard. (R. 303.) Jarvis was a ma~rried man with
a wife and three children. (R. 237, 2'38.) Plaintiff
met Jarvis on Jarvis' birthday, August 11, 1961, at
6:30 P.M., drank with him in barrooms ~and stayed
out with him all night until 5:00 A.M. (R. '28128'2.)
Defendant testified tlnt, when plaintiff arrived
home at early hours in the morning, she was repeatedly under the influence of alcohol and neglected
the children and that on such occasions defendant
did care for the children. (R. 43'2, 44'9, 452, 457,
461-462.) It is apparent that plaintiff, ~after her
admitted nightly escapades in ·barrooms and staying
out all night, could not possibly have been in a condition, physically or otherwise, to provfde proper
care for her children.
1

Plaintiff surreptiously used family funds of
the parties for the purpose of purchasing gifts for
Jarvis and for the purpose of dissipation with Jarvis.
12
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Defendant maintained a joint checking account with
Walker Bank and Trust Company upon which plaintiff was permitted to draw. (Exs. 14 & 19, R. 264,
265.) On August 9, 1961, plaintiff drew check No.
3760 in 'the amount of $20.00 on the account, payable to Par Men's 'Shop, for the purchase of a sport
shirt for Jarvis at 'a price of $12.80. (Ex. 19, R.
277~281.) In the check register (Ex. 14) plaintiff
entered opposite check No. 3760, "'Pars, dentist, tie,
lunch, etc., $'20.00." On August 4, 1961, plaintiff
noted in her diary that Jarvis telephoned her and
wanted to know how much money she hald given
him the night before on August 3rd which was an
occasion when she met Jarvis at 7:00 P.M., went
with him to a barroom, stayed with him until 3:00
A.M., "and was bad again." (R. 274-275.) Defendant testified that throughout the summer of 1961,
he purchased the groceries for the family. (R. 4'27.)
Defendant produced checks cashed by plaintiff
totalling $498;26 at Grand Central M'aTket during
the period from May 22, 1961, to August 24, 1961,
while she was consorting with Jarvis. (Ex. 43, R.
427.)
At the height of her affair with Jarvis plaintiff deliberately set forth in her own handwriting a
fraudulent design and scheme to commence this divorce action against defendant and to take from
defendant his children, his home, his property and
13
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his money. (Exs. 6 & 7, 214-219.) Plaintiff admitted in her own handwriting that she commenced
this divorce action because of her relationships with
Jarvis and not because of misconduct on the part
of the defendant. (Ex. 23, R. 286-·288, 316.)
On July 14, 1961, plaintiff stayed out all night
with Jar-Vis. (R. 204.) On July 18 plaintiff made an
engagement with Jarvis for the following night.
(R. 208.) On July 19 plaintiff spent the night with
Jarvis in a barroom. (R. 209.) She thereupon on
July 2·2, 1961, write shorthand notes, Exhibits 6 and
7, in which she laid ·the ground work for this divorce action :and, in particular, made plans to work
toward her goal, to keep records of her husband's
business, to see that she got 'her share of the money,
to rifle his desk, and to hire her own attorney and
take legal action against him. (Exs. 6 & 7, R. 2142t9.)
:Three days la,ter on July 25, 1961, plaintiff
made the following false entries in the check register
of the joint accoun t of the parties With Walker
Bank and Trust Company: c:heck No. 3716, "cash,
$1'5.00"; Check No. 374'2, "difference in mistake of
deposit, $75.00"; Check No. 3718, "school clothes
and win,ter pajamas, $50.00"; Check No. 3741
"p~aint, $20.00"; and, on July 31, 1961, Check No.
37 49 with no designation, in the amount of $20.00.
(Ex. 14. R. 264-268.) Plaintiff in fact dated each of
1

1
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these checks July 31, 1961, and made each of them
payable to Murray First Thrift and Loan Company.
(Ex. 15, R. 264-268.) On July 31, 1961, pJa,intiff
opened a joint savings account in hers and her husband's name with ·Murray First Thrift and Loan
Company, of which defendant testified he had knowledge. (Ex. 42, R. 264-'268, 427.) On the same day,
July 31, 1961, plaintiff opened a separate savings
account in her name alone in the Murray First
Thrift and Loan Company, of which defenldant had
no knowledge. (R. 264-268.) She deposited the
checks No. 3716, 3'718, 3741, 3742, and 3749, as
to which she had made the false entries in the check
1·egister, in the account in her name ·alone. ( Exs. 15
& 16, R. 264-26'9.) Plaintiff asserted at trial that
defendant had knowledge of both the joint account
and private account (R. 264) and then explained
that she opended the private ·a~ecount because, ,at the
time 1che-n she commenced the divorce action, the
d-efendant had closed the joint checking account.
(R. 264, 39'6.) The private account was opened on
July 31, 1961. Plaintiff did not commence the divorce action and defendant did not close the joint
checking account until one month later. (R. 1-9,
2'86-289.) It is 'apparent that plaintiff's testimony
was false and that this whole transaction was a part
of the deliberate plan set out in plaintiff's shorthand notes dated July 22, 1'961, to divorce defendant
·and take his money.
15
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For the next month, from July 25, 1961, to
August 18, 19 61, plaintiff was in daily contact with
Jarvis, and spent her nights with him in barrooms,
and on several occasions stayed out all night with
him. (R. '269..;2'86.) After Friday, August 18, Jarvis
stopped contacting pliaintiff. (R. 286, 287.) She,
therefore, on August '23 made an appointment with
McCullough to commence this divorce action and
have her husband removed from the home because
of Jarvis. (R. 287.) She noted in her diary that on
Friday, August 18, Jarvis told her he woutd call
her 'the next week. She thereafter made the following entries in the diary concerning Jarvis. Monday,
August 21, "Not a word did I hear." (R. 286.)
Tuesday, August 22, "Not a word again. I don't
understand." ('R. 286.) Wednesday, August 23, "It
is now 12:30. No phone call today. The message
seems to be coming through loud and clear. I made
an appointment to see Mr. McCullough." (R. 287.)
1

1

Plaintiff signed the complaint ~before McCullough on August 24, 1961. The complaint set forth
under ·oath that defendant, "on many occasions physically beat and abused plaintiff." The verifications
set forth that plaintiff had read the complaint, knew
its contents and that the same were true of her own
knowledge. rt was signed by plaintiff and subscribed
an·d s:worn to by her before Leland S. McCullough,
her attorney. (R. 1-4.) (R. 7-8.) Plaintiff testified
16
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at trial that she did not know that defendant had
ever be a ten her. ( R. 288. ) She further testified, by
way of explanation, that she signed the complaint
without reading it. (R. 395.) The verification, sworn
to before her attorney, expressly set forth that she
had. (R. 4.) On August 2·5, 1961, defendant was
removed from his home and children under the restraining order. ( R. '288-'29~2.)
On August 26, 1961, the day after the restraining order was issued, defendant, in an effort to
save his home and children, attempted to effect a
reconciliation and, without the ·benefit of counsel,
entered into a stipulation with plaintiff's attorney
providing that the ·hearing on the restralining order
be continued without daJte. (R. 10, 457.) Defendant
also on August 26 arranged with plaintiff to move
back into the home, but plaintiff insisted that defendant remain away from the home until Sunday,
August 27. ·(R. 292-2'94, 457.) She explained that
she did this because she wanted to give her husband
some time to "think" and because she wanted to
find out ·about her "family problems". ( R. 294.) She
had in fact on Friday, August 25, the day she had
her husband removed from the home, made an engagement with Jiarvis to meet him at 3:00 P.M. on
Saturday, August 26. (R. 291~294.) She met Jarvis
at 3:30 P.M. on Saturday, August 26, and stayed
out with him until 2 :00 A.M. on Sunday, August
17
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27. (R. 291-294.) Defendant testified that he in
fact returned home on Saturday night ia:t approximately midnight because the children had been left
alone with a young baby sitter, and lhe was worried
about them. (R. 457.) Defendant was at the home
when plaintiff returne'd from her es~apade with
Jarvis at 2:00 A.M. on Sunday morning. (R. 457.)
Defendant further testified that plaintiff told him
that he had a filthy mind if he thought she had
been out on a date and that she thereafter 1a~wakened
the child, Lisa, and said, "Look at your father, isn't
he nice, now he is crying." (R. 457.)
On Sunday, August '27, defendant took plaintiff and the two children on a trip to Jackson Lake
and an outing sponsoreld by Equitable Life Assurance Society, from whiCh they returned on August
31. They did not get along well on the trip. (R. 2942'96, 457-460.) Defendant testified that on the way
home plaintiff to'ld him she was going to have a
baby and that, if she did, he was responsible but
he would never see it. ( R. 296, 459.) Defendant
was amazed because he had not had marital relations with plaintiff since prior to July 13, 1961.
(R. 459.)
1

Thereafter on September 5, 1961, plaintiff took
up with Jarvis again. S;he met him at 6:15 P.M.,
spent the evening with him in a barroom, and stayed
out with hlim until2 :00 A.M. When she arrived home
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she was sick and remained in bed all of the following day. She noted in her diary, "Poor Howard.
He was worried about me !and I was sick." (R. 297.)
The next day, September 7, she noted in her
diary that Jarvis called again, he had a hangover
'and that she offered to bring him a record an·d some
spaghetti to comfort him. ( R. 300, 301.)
On Saturday, September 9, plaintiff went to
a barroom and met Jarvis there. ( R. 302.) On Sunday, September 10, plaintiff went and consorted
with Jarvis in his apartment during the daytime.
(R. 301-303.) On cross ex1amination she was asked
where her children were in the meantime. She explained that they were in church with her husband.
('R. 303.)
On Monday, September 11, 1961, Jarvis did
not call plaintiff. ( R. 309.) Defendant testified that
at this point plaintiff again insisteld thiat he move
out of his home by Tuesday, Septe1nber 12, and told
him that, if he d'id not, s'he would get another restraining order and have him m'oved out. (R. 447.)
Defendant moved out of his home again on September 12. (R. 447.) Plaintiff wrote in her letter
to Jarvis, shorthand note, Exhibit 2·3, the following
concerning the event: ''Your last words to me were:
'I will call tomorrow' (M'Onday). You didn't call
Monday. I had a quarrel with Howard on Tues'day
and insisted he move out. I am tiTed of going to
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the attorney again if he didn't. He did move. You
didn't phone on Tuesday. You .didn't phone on W.e!tnes.day. I w.as sick Wednesday night * * *." ( R.
316.) The record is ·clear that on this occasion plaintiff again caused her husband to be moved out of
his home and separated from his chi1dren because
of her relationship with Jarvis under circumstances
identical to those under which she commenced this
divorce action on August 25, 1961, and had him
thrown out of his home by use of a rest~aining order.
(R. 286~288.) She also noted in her diary that Jarvis
did not call from Tuesday, September 12, through
Thursday, September 1'4, and on September 14 she
wrote in her diary, "It is now 1:00 and so far no
phone calls * * * The writing on the wall is pretty
clear. Guess this is it * * *." (R. 309-311.) Thereafter she noted in her diary that s'he was sick in
bed all day from Friday, September 15 to Monday,
September 18, (R. 311) and she wrote in her letter
to Jarvis, (Ex. 23), concerning the event fuiat, "the
doctor couldn't figure out what was wrong- but
I knew and couldn't tell him." (R. 317.)
On Sunday, September 24, plaintiff noted in
her diary that, "Howard came home. Tha11k goodness." (R. 311.) This demonstrates clearly that,
having been jilted lby Jarvis, plaintiff 'had no further reason to have her husband out of his home.
On Wednesday, September ·27, she noted in the diary
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that her husband gave her $300.00 for new carpeting. ( R. 312.) This was the last entry in the diary.
Mter Jarvis jilted her, plaintiff wrote the letter
to Jarvis, (Ex. 23), in wnieh she blamed Jarvis for
all of her difficulties 1and said of her husband that
he 'had put forth extra effort to get along and was
truly in love With her, ''true h'is every glance, his
every dee·d." ( R. 315~318, 341.)
In the meantime, what was the defendant doing during the year, 1961, in addition to protecting
and caring for 'h is chil'dren and endeavoring to save
his ·home and family? Defendan~t had been employed
~ls an agent for Equitable Life Assurance Society
only three years before. (R. 411.) The Salt Lake
agency of Equitable Life Assurance Society covers
the entire state of Utah and part of Nevada. (R.
412.) From June 5 to August 21, 1961, while plaintiff was engaged in destroying the family, defendant
lead the entire agency in new policies sold and placed
second in total production. (Ex. 39, R. 412.) In
the fall sales campaign ending December 19, 1961,
defendant lead the en~tire agen'cy in both new policies sold ~and total volume. (Ex. 40, R. 413.) For
the entire year, 1961, defendant placed third in the
entire agency in total production. (Ex. 41, R. 413.)
Defendan't's net in'come, as shown by the record
and found by the court, was only $546.00 per month
1
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because there h~ad not been time for his renewal
premiums to build up. (R. 181, 486-487.)
In an effort to establish condonation against
defendant plaintiff testified on the witness stand
that, after defendant returned to the home in 'September, 19'61, she disclosed the affair with Jarvis
to him. (R. 211.) This was bald perjury. Her testimony on cross examination, with reference to the
so-called disclosure, was evasive and amounted to
nothing more than a general statement to the effect
that she an'd 'her husband had a discussion in which
they stated that they would let by-gones by by-gones.
(R. 211, 212.) On January 15, 1962, defendant dis:covered the diary (R. 320, 494.) Defendant recorded a ·convers~ation between himself and plaintiff on
January 1'8, 1962. (Ex. 25, R. 320-322.) In the conversation defendant asked plaintiff if 'she was going
to deny the contents of the diary th'at he 'h'ad discovered. PTaintiff replied, "You're God-damned right I
am." She 'then in the conversation proceeded to deny
the 'con'ten'ts of the diary, the specific events set forth
therein, and stated that it was an a fiction. (Ex.
25.) Plaintiff knew that defendant was recording
the conversation. She said at one stage to defendant,
'''If you want to try it on another tape I will say
it on another tape for you." (Ex. 25.) Plaintiff admitted at tri'al that the transcript of the tape was
true. (R. 320-322 . ) In any event there was no con1

1
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donation because of the events that occured between
September of 1961 and January of 1962, when defendant discovered the di1ary.
Defendant testified that throughout the marriage and particularly in November and December
of 1961, an'd J'anuary of 196·2, plaintiff persistently
used foul and o·bscene l~anguage 'and referre'd to
defendant as a ~'son-of-a-·bitch" and "bastard" and
by other more obscene epithets in the presence of
the children. ( R. 415, 464, 466-469.) Plaintiff admitted that she customarily referred to defendant
as a "son-of-a-bitch" an,d "bastard". (R. 3'29-330.)
At this point plaintiff denied generally that
she carried on other lewd 'a.nd obscene conversations
in the presence of the children and visited obscenity
upon the children. ( R. 2'54.) She was then asked
on cross examination specifically whether or not
in a conversation with :defendant and the child,
Kirt, age 8, and the child, Lisa, age 6, she had not
S'aid, "Play with your te·ats, Howard. Are they growing. Look, Lisa, he is rubbing 'his teats." (R. 254261.) She twice under oath categorically denied that
any such 'conversation ever occurred. ( R. 254.) She
again committed perjury. She was then confronted
with a tape recording of a convers~ation between
herself, her two children an'd her husband on January 21, 1962, six weeks before trial, and asked
whether or not she wished to have the recording
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played for the court. She replied that she did not
and stipulated that Exhibit 17 could be received
in evidence as a true and correct transcript of the
recording of the conversation on January 21, 1962.
( R. 25'5-2'61.) In the conversation plaintiff said in
the presence of her children, "Play with your teats,
Howard. Are they growing?" Defendant pleaded
with her to stop. She refused and thereafter called
to the child, Lisa, and said, ''Look, Lisa, he is rubbing his teats.'' (Ex. 17.) It is apparent that plaintiff is the type of woman that can come into court
with a straight face an~d deny her insidious conduct
with reference to the chil,dren; but, when confronted
with specific proof, she is forced to admit the depravity visited upon them.
On cross examination plaintiff was confronted
with Exhibits 28 through 37. (R. 332-337.) 'The
documents are as 'Obscene as it would be possible
for the human mind to conceive. Exhibit 28 deals
with a small girl of tender years becoming involved
in a sexual rel'a:tionship and thereafter conducting
herself as a prostitute. Exhibit 29 deals with a small
boy of the age of ten years, at the suggestion of his
mother, bei'ng exposed to a degraded sexual relationship between his young sister and a third party
in the home of the family. Exhibi't 30 deals in an
obscene manner wi'th the physical and emotional aspects of sexu'al intercourse. Exhibit 31 is an obscene
1
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parody on services in church, involving as principals a minister of the gospel, the women members
and children. Plaintiff testified that she acquired
this material prior to the marriage of the parties
and that she kept it in a drawer in the downstairs
of the home together with some other things belonging to her children. ( R. 332.) She claimed she had
not read the material for so long that she did not
1·emem:ber its contents and, therefore, could not identify it as the material she had gathered together
and kept. (R. 332, 337.) She then testified that by
reading the first three lines of Exhibit 28 she had
a good idea as to the blalan·ce of the contents (R.
332.) and by reading the first two lines of Exhibit
29 she had a good idea of the balance of its contents.
( R. 333.) The first three lines of Exhibit 28 and
the first two lines of Exhibit 29 ~are completely innocuous. If plaintiff coul~d tell the balance of the
contents from reading those lines, either one of two
things is certain. She remembered the contents of
the documents or she has a completely depraved imagination. The alternative is immaterial so far as
it pertains to her fitness as a custodian of minor
children. Defendant testified that he first saw these
documents when he discovered plaintiff reading them
in May of 1961, that he told plaintiff to get rid of
them because exposure would be extremely damaging to the children and that plaintiff said she would
25
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get rid of them. (R. 416-419.) Defendant found the
documents ·and took them with him when he was
removing his financial records from the home after
the discovery of plaintiff's diary on January 15,
1962. (R. 418.) The admitted facts are that plaintiff, unbeknown to her husband, brought this material into the marri~age, th·at she carried it from home
to home of the parties, and tha:t she was keeping
it in ~a drawer in an open room together with other
things belonging to her children.
1

Plaintiff got a job during the months of November and December of t961. (Ex. 1, R. 13, 354.)
On Decem·ber 2'8 or December 29, 1961, p1aintiff
left the home of the parties an·d attended !a cocktail
party given by her former employer. (R. 390-391,
354, 559.) She testified that she remained at the
party from 12:00 Noon until late in the afternoon,
that thereafter she drove andther man to his apartment, ian·d th·at thereafter she returne'd to her home.
(R. 390-3'91.) Defendant testified that plaintiff returned home in a drunken condition and that defendant, who had been caring for the children
throughout the day, thereupon took the children out
to dinner in order to avoid their exposure to the situation. (R. 466.) Defendant further testified th~at
1iliereafter plaintiff locked him ~and the children out
of the home until approxim·ately 11:00 o'clock P.M.
when defendant broke into the house in order to
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gain entrance for his children. (R. 466, 467.) Plaintiff denied that she locked them out. (R. 559.) The
next door neighbor, whom plaintiff had called as a
witness, testified that she observed defen·dant attempting to gain entrance into the home. (R. 516517.)
On January 15, 1962, defendant discovered the
diary and plaintiff's s'horthand notes. (R. 320, 494.)
He thereupon, in order to obtain a speedy trial and
without prejudice to his rights and without ~admit
ting that plaintiff was ·a fit person to have custody
of the children temporarily or otherwise, entered
into the stipulation dated January 31, 196'2, an·d
moved out of the home pen·ding trial. (R. 11-12, 198,
477.) The case was set down for tri~al on M'arch 13,
1962, (R. 18.)
During the period 'between the time that defendant moved out of the home and the date of trial,
plaintiff left the children a great part of the time
with baby tenders. (R. 185, 472-473, 35'5, 515.)
1

Plaintiff asserted at trial that defendant had
been having an affair with a young woman employed at Equitable Life Assurance Society. Plaintiff testified that in February of 1H61, defendant
~admitted to plaintiff that he had been out wifu this
woman. (R. 194-195, 224-225.) Plaintiff made the
following entry in her diary on March 13, 1961:
''It is out ; it is over ; it is in the open. 'Karen' is her
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name. He has never had her out, but is mad about
her. Sad!!" The only evidence as to any association
:between defendant and this young woman is the
following. Defendant, in the company of plaintiff,
saw the girl at an Equitable Life Assurance p·arty
at Lagoon. (R. 197.) Defendant also saw the girl
in the office of Equitable Life Assurance Society,
Where both he and the girl worked. (R. 197.) The
girl was a musician. (R. 428.) Defendant was a
musician by hobby and owned a tape recorder. (R.
428.) The girl asked the defendant if he would make
a recording of a musical trio, which included the
girl, ~a young man, and an older lady, playing their
musical instruments. (R. 428.) Defendant asked
his wife if he could invite them to defendant's home
to make the recording. (R. 428.) Plaintiff replied
that, if defen·dant did, she would be away. (R. 428.)
Defendant thereupon went alone to the girl's parent's
home at which the girl's parents, her grandparents,
her boy friend, and the older lady were present,
and made the recording of these people playing their
musical instruments. Thereafter defendant left the
people-·and went home. (R. 428.)
Plaintiff further asserted at trial th at defendant drank to excess. (R. 190.) Defendant denied
the aceusation. ( R. 431.) Plaintiff's own witness,
called for the purpose of corroborating her testimony, testified on cross examination that he had
1
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been in the company of defendant at several parties
given by Equitable Life Assurance Society \Vhere
liquor was served, that he had never seen defendant
drink to excess, that defendant had always conducted
himself as a gentlem·an, th·at defendant was never
intoxica ted. (R. 365-3'68.) Earl L. Maw, Certified
Life Underwriter for Equitable, testified to the
same effect. (R. 485-4'87.) At this point it should
be noted that it does not lie in plaintiff's mouth to
accuse defendant of excessive drinking or to set
herself up as a judge of such ~a matter. Immediately
following her affair wi'th Jarvis in his ap·artment
on Sunday, September 10, 1961, plaintiff wrote in
shorth·and note (Ex. 21) concerning fue event, "It
was the first time you have been together without
drinking. How did you find it? Very dull." (Ex. 21,
R. 304.) The reco~d is replete with evidence of plaintiff's nigh tly escapades in barrooms on the west
side of Salt Lake City, p. 19'9-310.
1

1

1

At trial plaintiff asserted, as an excuse for
her misconduct that resulted in this divorce, that it
made up for some of the hurt that she had suffered
at fue hands of defendant. (R. 3'28.) When Jarvis
terminated h'is relationship with plaintiff, she blamed
Jarvis for a;ll of her difficulties and wrote in Exhibit 23 the following concerning Jarvis, "If I could
only turn some of the hurt I feel for myself into
hurting you." (R. 315.) It is apparent that, re29
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gardless of the type of man with whom plaintiff
associates, she blames her difficulties upon the man.
It is submitte·d th~a.t plaintiff's accusations
against defendant were irresponsible and groun'dless; and, in any event, she admitted that he was a
good father, and she did ndt in any respect remotely
infer th·at defenrdant ever neglected or visited moral
dep~a.vity upon his children.
At trial plaintiff on the wi'tness stand repeatedly
represented 'to the court that she was ashamed, contrite and apologetic about her misconduct. (R. 213,
227, 270.) The evidence in her own handwriting
completely refutes this. In Febru·ary of 1962, less
tllan a mon th before trial, she wrote the folloWing
note to her husband (Ex. 27.) "You certainly are
a sneaky bastard. Aren't you? You must feel pretty
darned good (inside th·at is). I don~t want to make
this difficult for you to r~ad. How did you enjoy
the notes out of my little black book - I made it
easy on some of them, .didn't I? You didn't even
have to figure them ottt in shorthand. But anyway, I
wish you could have borrowed them without folding them down the middle. But I know what a
Sloppy Pig you are. You will notice that I capitalize
all the name:s I call you." (R. 828-329.)
1

Pl·aintiff offered the testimony of Mrs. Dorothea M. McDonald, one of the children's school
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teachers, to the effect that, when the children came
to school, they appeared to be well fed and clothed
and that on the occasions that Mrs. McDonald h·ad
met plaintiff, plaintiff appeared to be interested in
her children. (R. 511-512, 345-346.) Mrs. McDonald
admrtted that she had only seen plaintiff on three
occasion·s, once at a Parent Teachers Association
meetin·g, once for a few moments at the school, and
once for a few moments just ·before the trial. (R.
352.) Mrs. McDonald knew absolutely nothing a·bout
plaintiff's immoral ·activities and her neglect and
visitation of depravity upon the ·children. (R. 346B52.)
Plaintiff also offere·d the evidence of Mrs. Beverly Ch·ase, one of plaintiff's neigh'bors, to the effect
that the children were always clean, well clothed
and .well fed an·d that the ·home of plaintiff appe'ared
to be physically clean. (R. 355-356, 518-519.) Mrs.
C'hase knew absolutely nothing ~about plaintiff's ·adulterous activities and her attendant visi~ation of
neglect ·and moral depravi'ty upon the children.
(R. 356, 357, 519.) The same was true of Mr.
Lawrence McCormack, Mrs. Glade J. Jensen, and
Mrs. Clarence L. Hall, called ·as witnesses on ·be·half
of plaintiff. (R. 384-389, 514-518, 506~511.)
1

The uncontroverted facts are that defen dant
always took the children to the Presbyterian Church
an·d ·atten·de·d with them and that plaintiff did not.
1

1
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See: testimony of Rev. Walter J. Kalvesmaki. (R.
482-484.) Pl aintiff offered as an excuse th·at prior
'to the marriage she had been L.D.S., defendant had
attended the Catholic Church, and that they agreed
they would not sen:d their children to the L.D.S.
Church or Catholic c·hurch, and therefore atten'ded
the Presbyterian Church. (R. 56'4.) Plaintiff's conduct, inclinations ~and stan·dards of morality, exemplifie·d throughout the entire record, negate any
notion that she was remotely exposed to, much less
influence·d by, the moral precepts and teaching of
the ChurCh of Jesus ·Christ of Latter-Day S'aints.
1

Plaintiff offered no evidence of a constructive
program for the care and protection of the children
if she were awarded their custody. Between the time
th·a:t defendant moved out of the home and the ·date
of trial, plaintiff left the children a great deal of
the time with baby tenders. ( R. 185, 472-4'73, 3'55,
51'5.) Her evidence was that they would be left with
baby tenders ·all 'the tin1e she works (R. 185,
198) and at such times as she engages in other activities commensurate with her inclinrations. (R. 1'99310.) Defendant's evidence was as follows. He is
prepared to spend a maximum amount of time with
his children. (R. 203-235, 303, 432, 449, 4'52, 457,
461-462, 482, 472, 473.) His mother, Mrs. R. A.
McBroom, Sr., returned home from Florid·a and is
prepared to expend her entire time caring for the
1
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children. (R. 480-481, 500-501.) Defendant had engaged ·a ·competent lady, who is :familiar with children, to care for the home an'd ·assist his mother in
caring for the children. (R. 481.) Defendant's sister-in-law, Mrs. R. A. McBroom, testified 'that her
own chiluren get along very well with defendant's
children, 'that she loves the children, an'd is prepared ~at any time in the event of an emergency or
other difficulty to take the children into her home
and care for them with her own. (R. 502-504.)
1

Plaintiff worked, off and on, for ~a total of 48
months during the ten years of marriage. (Ex. 1,
R. 184.) The com'bined income of ·~he 'p·arties for
the ten years was $80,046.27, of which defendant
earned $6'5,496.08 and plaintiff earned '$14,231.19.
(Ex. 46, R. 4·79-480.)
Defendant became ill in the summer of 1957
and was hospitalized for approximately one month.
(R. 434-43·5.) Plaintiff claimed that, when ~defen
dant became ill, she went to work ·and supported the
family over an extended period of time because as
a result of the illness defendant did not make sufficient money to support the family in 1957. (R. 36136·3.) In fact, defendant went to work upon release
from the hospital in the summer of 1957 and was
only off work six weeks. (R. 43 5.) Defendant's
~average net in·come for the ten years of marriage
was $6,546.90 per year. (Ex. 46, R. 479-480.) De1

33
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fendant's net income from his earnings during the
year, 19'57, was $6,454.13. (Ex. 46, R. 479-480.)
Plaintiff's contention was without merit.
During the marrilage the parties acquired the
following property: a home located at 583 Cortez
Street, Salt L ake City, U'tah, purchased on October
15, 19'54, of the approximate value of $16,000.00,
subject 'to ·a mortgage in the approximate amount
of $11,300.00; household furniture and fixtures
located in the home; a stereo set; a 1959 Chevrolet
automobile, customarily driven by defendant; a 19'56
C'adill·ac automobile purchased for plaintiff in November of 1961; and, life insurance on the life of
defendant in the face amount of approximlaJtely
$35,000.00, of whi'ch $12,000.00 was term insurance.
( R. 176-'180.)
1

1

During ·the m~arriage the parties incurred the
following obligations testified to at trial: mortgag€
on the home, in favor of Equitable Life Assurance
Society, in the amounrt of $11,300.00, upon which
the monthly payments were $90.00 per month; mortgage on the household furniture, in the amount of
$ 700.00, p~ayable in monthly installments of $31.00
per month; mortgage on the stereo set in the amount
of $114.00, p'ayable in m'Onthly installments of $19.00
per month; mottgage on the 1959 Chevrolet in the
amounrt of $6'50.00, p~aya~ble at $78.00 per month;
and, mortgage on the 1956 Ca·dillac automobile in
1

1

34
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the amount of $1,350.00, payable in monthly installments of $78.00 per month; and, certain current obligati1ons a.s to which plaintiff offered no evidence.
(R. 177-180.) Affivadits filed by defen·dan't in support of defendant's motion for new trial and alternative motions to amend the findings of fact and decree showed the amount of these current obligations
to be $1,088.02. (R. 53.) The total insurance premiums, payable by defendant under his insurance
policies, were $27.18 per month for life insurance
covering the mortgage on the home (R. 59) an·d
$18.00 per month for dther life insuran1ce premiums.
(R. 52.)
Plaintiff was working at time of trial and
earning $370.00 per month. Defendant was earning
$'546.00 per month. (R. 39.)
The trilal court awarded the defendant the divorce an·d plaintiff $1.00 per year alimony. ('R. 424'4.) He then proceeded to find plaintiff to be ·a fit
and proper person to have the care ·and custody of
the minor children (R. 38-39), awarded plaintiff
cus'tody of 'the children, awarded plaintiff all of the
property of the p·arties, with the exception of the
19'59 Chevrolet automobile and the stereo set, awarded plaintiff $200.00 p·er month for the support of
the two minor children, ordered defendant to pay
all of the obligations of the parties wi'th the exception of the mortgage on the home and the mortgage
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on the Cadill ac automobile, ordered defendant to
keep his life insurance in force for the minor children, and awarde·d plaintiff a judgment against defendant in the amount of $750.00 to assist her in
paying her attorneys fees for fraudulently bringing
this action. ( R. 42-44.)
The defendant, in ·an affidavit in support of a
motion for new trial and to amend the fin'dings of
fact and decree, set forth that he was withoutt funds
to pay the current obligations and plain'tiff's attorneys fees, which totaled $1,8'38.02, and that defendant would lbe require·d to fin ance the payment
of same through a collateral loan upon which the
monthly payments would be $115.90 for eighteen
months. ( R. 5'2-54.)
Under the decree, therefore, defendant is earning a net income of $546.00 per month and is required to pay installment obligations, including
$'200.00 support money, !totaling $489.08 per month,
leavin·g ~defendant a n·et income upon which to live
in the amount of $56;9'2 before payment of rent
and federal and state in·come taxes.
1

1

1

Under the decree plaintiff h·as a net income of
$'370.00 per month from her employment, $200.00
per month support money, or a tdtal of $570.00 per
month and is only required to pay $168.00 per month
in installment obligations, leaving plaintiff with
$402.00 per month for the support of herself and
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the two minor children and no obligation to pay
rent because the court awarded her defendant's
home.
By way of explan·ation the following should be
noted with reference to plaintiff's appeal in this
ma:tter. The tri al court entered its findings ·and ·decree on April 23, 1962. ( R. 38-44.) On June 2·5,
19'62, defendant moved the court for an order, pending tnis appeal, fixing defendant's rights of visitati~on, restraining plaintiff from punishing the children for visiting their father, restraining plaintiff
from attempting to degrade their father in their
minds ~and from ~attemptin~g to alienate the ch ildren,
and restraining plaintiff from removing the children
from the State of Utah, (R. 9'2-97) because plaintiff had repeatedly ·and persisten tly denield defendant rights of visitation of the children, punished
the children for visiting with defendant, use·d the
children and refused defendant his rights of visitation in attempts to extort money from defendant,
threatened to remove the children from 'the State of
Utah i'f defendant con'tinued to prosecute this appeal
and plaintiff had continued Ito visilt neglect and moral
depravity upon the children. (R. 95-97.) Plaintiff
filed 'a counterpetition in which plaintiff agreed to
submit fue m·a tter of visi ta:tion to the court ( R. 98) ,
and sought to hold defendant in contempt on a false
claim that defendant was behind one month in pay1

1

1
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ment of support money. (R. 98-101.) A hearing was
had on this matter on July 9 and July 11, 1962.
( R. 582-67 4.) The tri'al court, J u'dge M'arcellus K.
Snow presjding, found all of the issues in favor of
defendant (R. 78-81), and on July 19, 1962, entered an order granting defendants rights of visitation and issued restrainin'g orders to guarantee enforcement, and thereupon awarded pl'aintiff 'a judgment against defendant in the sum of $12'5.00 for
attorneys fees in connection with this hearing. (R.
82-84.) Plaintiff thereupon procee·ded to violate the
court's order CR. 114-115, 117-122, 675-691) and
defendant was again required to bring plaintiff into
court on con tempt ch~arges (R. 114-115) before
Judge A. H. Ellett on the 27th day of July, 1962,
( R. 67'5-6'91) in order to procure enforcement of
the order. (R. 675-691, 1'27-129.)
1

Plaintiff appeals to this court from the order
of Judge Snow and defendant cross-appeals from
th,alt p,art of 'the order awarding plaintiff the additional $12·5.00 attorneys fees. The p'arties stipulated
in th is ·court that defendant's appeal from the decree of divorce and plaintiff's appeal from the order
of Judge Snow entered on July 19, 1962, may be
consolid1~ted for purpose of hearing in this court.
1
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING CUSTODY OF THE MINOR ·CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES
TO PLAINTIFF.

The trial court felt th~at, under the decision in
Steiger v. Steiger (19"56) 4 U.2d 273, 293 P.2d
--118, it was justified in awarding custody to the
plaintiff and n·ot to the defen'dant. In Steiger v.
Steiger the Supreme Court held that the wife was
entitled to the custody of the three year old child
against her husband where \the eviden~e, interpreted
most strongly against the wife, was that ( 1) on
two or three occasions she drank alcoholic beverages
to the point of mild intoxication, (2) was frequently seen with a man dther than her husband, (3)
was not a good housekeeper, ·and ( 4) there was no
evidence of ~adultery on the part of the wife and ( 5)
there was no evidence that the wife's con~duct ever
rendered her unable to properly care for the child
and (6) the evidence showed that the wife's parent's were be1tter able to offer assistance to the
wife and the child th'an were the husband's parents
and (7) evidence showe·d that the wife's love for
the child caused her to spend her free time with
him, and (8) the evidence showed that the father,
while he was wfth the child, was abusive to it and
had little eoncern for the c·hild's welfare. The court
is so holding said at 293 P.2d p. 420:
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"Stating the case against (the wife) in
the strongest possible manner, testimony of
witnesses indicated that she ( 1) drank in'to)Cicating liquors two or three times to the
point of mild intoxication, (2) was frequently
seen with a man other than her husband, and
( 3) was not a good housekeeper. All of this
testimony however came from defendant's
witnesses and was rebutted by plaintiff and
her witnesses.
* * * *
''There is no proof in the record that this
mother drinks excessively so as to render her
unable to properly care for the child, nor is
there any evidence of promiscuity.
"Reading the record as a whole it appears that (the wife) has been in the past
careless and indis·creet, but that her love of
the child has caused her to work to provide
for him, has caused her to spend her free time
with him, and care for hi's needs, an·d has
caused her to fight for his custody. In the
li'ght of these facts it canndt be s'aid that she
is an unfit mother.
"'This court has stated that 'a divorced
mother has no absolute right to the custody
of minor children under U.C.A. 1953, 30-3-10,
Sampsell v. Holt, 150 U. 73, 202 P.2d 550,
but the policy of our decisions has been to give
weight to the view that all things being equal,
preference should be given to the mother in
awarding custody of ·a child of tender years,
notwithstanding the divorce is granted to the
f,ather. * * * And this Yiew is 'based upon the
oft-stated. purpose of the award of custody
to provi'de for the child's best interest and
welfare * * *.
1
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" * * * The (wife's) parents are bette1

1

able to offe,· financial assistance to (the wife)
and the child than are (the husband's) parents * * *. Additionally, there is no evidence
that the mother has ever neglected the child,
although she has had his sole care while the
father was serving in the army; there is some
evidence that the father was somewhat abusive to the child when he did have contact
with him, and has been little concerned with
the child's welfare."
The decision in Steiger v. Steiger does not support
the trial cour't's award of custody of 'the children to
the plain'tiff. It is authority dire·ctly to the contrary. T:he evidence is conclusive that the plaintiff
repeatedly committed adultery; that she did not
spend her free time with her children, but spent it
in dissipation and illicit relationships; that ·she repeatedly stayed out all night, drank al'coholic beverages, and did not provide care for the children;
tllat she SU'bjectively visited insidious rand immoral
depravity upon the children; that defendant never
was abusive to the children, was a good :father, and
provided adequate care and protection for the ·children, particularly during periods of his wife's depravity and neglect; and, that defendant's family
is prepared to offer every assistance in the care
of the children, and there is no evidence that pl'aintiff's family has or will offer any assistance in ·the
care of 'the children. The evidence shows thlat plain1
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tiff has, and intends to, continuously leave the children with baby tenders.
In cases where the evidence shows adultery, use
of intoxicants over an exten·ded period, or other
dissipation, on the part of a parent and that evidence is coupled with neglect of the children, or
with visitation of immoralrty upon the children, the
Supreme Court has uniformly approved depriving
the parent of custody of the children. See: Walton
v. Coffman (1946) 110 U. 1, 139 P.2d 97; In Re
Olson (19'47) 111 U. 365, 180 P.2d 210; In Re
Bradley (1946) 109 U. 538, 197 P.2d 978; and
State of Utah in the Interest of K----- B----- (19 58)
7 U.2d 398, 326 P.2d 395.
1

In Walton v. Coff'YlWn (1946) 110 U. 1, 139
P.2d 97, the evi dence showed that the mother associated with men other than her husband, used alcoholic beverages over an extended period, and th~at
at su'ch times she neglected 'the children, who were
nine and ten years ·of age. The Supreme Court reversed the trial cour't, deprived the mother of custody of
the children and awarded custody to the grandp'arents on the ground tllat it was in the best interest of the children. The Supreme Court held that
~abstinence by the mother from such misconduct
from the time of commencement of the action down
to the date of trial was not of sufficient probative
v~alue to overcome the ·admitted evidence of her
1
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misconduct up until the time of commencement of
the litigation because of the inherent inclination
on the part of the mother to refrain from such
conduct while the litigation was pending. The evidence in this case shows such misconduct on the
part of Mrs. McBroom both before and after commencement of the action.
In re Olson (1947) 111 U. 365, 180 P.2d 210,
the evidence showed that the father used alcoholic
beverages over an extended period and, during this
period, left the child, age eight, with an aunt and
grandparents and did not provide personal care for
the child. On appeal to the Supreme Court the father
claimed that because the child was receiving adequate care from other relatives, it was not a neglected child and, therefore, the trial court erred in depriving him of custody and granting custody to
the aunt and grandparents. The Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court and held that evidence that
other relatives provide care for a child personally
neglected by a parent, does not negative the fact
that the parent has neglected his parental responsibility and th·at the child is a neglected child. In the
case before this court the admitted facts are that
Mrs. McBroom continuously spent her time in barrooms and carried on her immoral and dissipated
relationships all hours of the day and night and
that, while she was so doing, she left the children
with either young baby sitters or the defendant, and
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she testified that she was not concerned about the
cllildrens' care because her 'husband wars 'a good
father. She persistently refused and by lying and
artifi~e avoided caring for, and engaging 'in activities concerne'd wi'th, the welfare of the children.
In re Bradley (1946) 109 U. 538, 197 P.2d
9'78, the evidence showed that the mother engaged
in relations out of wedlock and over a three month
period left the child in question in the care of an
aunt and uncle ~and during this period neglected the
child. ·The Supreme Court held that, where the evidence showed immorality on the p·art of the mother
and neglect of the child over a three month period,
the child was a neglected child and affirmed the
trial court in depriving the mother of custody of
the infant and awarding custody to the 'aun't and
uncle.
In State of Utah in the Interest of K----- B----(19'58) 7 U.2d 398, 3'26 P.2d 395, the Supreme
Court in depriving the father of custody of his
child said in its opinion that the obscenity visited
upon the child should be spared the light of print
and therefore did not set it out in its opinion. In
the case before this court the moral depravity visited
by plaintiff upon the children is of such a n~ature
that it likewise should be spared the light of print.
If it were assumed for purposes of argument
only that plaintiff is a fit person to have the custody
of the children, the trial court nevertheless erred in
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awarding custody to pl'aintiff because it is in the
best interest of the children that custody be ·awarded to defendanlt.

Sec. 30-3-5, U.C.A., 1953, provides: "When a
decree of divorce is made the court m·ay make such
orders 'in relation to the children * * * as may be
equitable * * *." Sec. 30-3-10, U.C.A., 1'953, provides: "In any case of separation of husband and
lvife having minor child~en, the mother shall be entitled to the care, custody and ·control of ·all such
children * * * (under the age of ten years) * * * ;
provided * * * that if it shall be made to appear
to a court * * * that the m·other is an immoral, incompetent or otherwise 'improper person, then the
court may award the custody of the children to
the father * * *."
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
the provision of Sec. 30-3-10, requiring a finding
th,at the mdther is an 'immoral, in·competent or otherwi'se improper person as a ·condition to the awarding custody of children under the age of ten years
to the father, applies only to cases of separation
and not to cases of divorce. The court h'as held that
Sec. 30-3-5, in providing that, when a de·cree of
divorce is made, the court may make such orders in
relation to the children as may be equitable, authorizes the ·court in cases ·df divorce to award custody o'f
the 'children to the father when i't is in the best inter45
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est of the ·children without a finding that the mother
is unfit. See: Johnson v. Johnson (1958) 7 U.2d 263,
32-3 P.2d 16, in which the court awarded custody of
·an eight year old child to the father where the eviden~e slhowed that the mother w~as living ·alone and
working because it was in the best interest of the
child; Jaques v. Jaques ( 1921) 58 U. 265, 198 P. 770,
in whi'ch the court awarded custody of the two children ages seven and ten, to the paternal gr~andmother
even though the court found the mother to be a fit
and proper person because it was in the children's
best interest; and, Sampsell v. Holt (1949) 115 U.
73, 202 P.2d 550.
In Stuber v. Stuber (1952) 121 U. 632, 244
P.2d 650, the wife brought an action to regain custody of the child from the husband. The court awarded custody of the child to the wife because the evidence showed that, while the child was living with
the husband, the husband, his mother and his second
wife were working and the child was required to
spend extended periods of time with baby tenders
while they were working; and, the evidence on behalf of the wife showed that she was living with
her grandmother, the maternal grandmother was
not working and the maternal grandmother and the
wife were prepared to offer the personal care of a
blood relative for the child at all times. In the case
before this court the evidence shows that defendant
46
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

is prepared to offer the care :of himself and ·blood
relatives for the children at all times and that plain.;.
tiff persistently and continuously leaves the child~
ren with baby tenders over extended periods.
In the final analysis the ultimate question· before this court is, what is in the best interest of the
children? To be raised in a background of insecurity,
1noral irresponsibility, neglect, depravity and baby
tenders; or, to be raised in a background of security,
moral responsibilty, integrity, ·adequate care and
protection, by their own relatives.
POINT 2.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
PLAINTIFF $200.00 PER MONTH FOR THE SUPPORT
OF THE TWO MINOR CHILDREN AND ALL OF THE
PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES.

If it were assumed for purposes of argument
only that plaintiff is a fit person to have the custody
of the children, which we do not admit, then in such
event the trial court abused its discretion in awarding plaintiff $200.00 per month for the support
of the two children and all of the property of the
defendant with the exception of his 1959 Chevrolet
automobile and a stereo set.
At the outset it must be remembered that
plaintiff, while she was carrying on an adulterous
and immoral relationship, consorting in barrooms,
staying out all hours of the night with ·a married
man, and forsaking her children and her home, de47
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li'berately conceived and set out in her own handwriting a scheme and plan to commence thlis divorce
action and take from defendant his children, his
home and his money and, right at the time of commencement of the action, plaintiff admitte·d in her
own handwriting that she did so, not because of misconduct on the part of defendant, but because of her
relationship with Jarvis.
Th·e finan·cial situation of the parties was not
good ·at 'the time of trial. It is small wonder when
viewed in the light of plaintiff's conduct.
Under the decree, the defendant is earning a
net in·come of $546.00 per month and is required to
pay monthly installment obligations, including
$200.00 support money, totalling $489.08 per month,
leaving defendant ·a net income upon which to live
in the amount of $56.92 before payment of rent
and federal and state income taxes. Under the decree plaintiff has a net income of $370.00 per month
from ~her employment, $200.00 per month support
money, a total of $570.00 per month, and is only
required to p·ay the installment payments on the
home and her Cadillac automobile in the amount of
$168.00 per month, leaving plaintiff with $402.00
per month for the support of herself and the two
minor children and no obligation to pay rent.
In cases where the wife has not been guilty of
misconduct and has been awarded the divorce be48
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cause of the husband's misconduct, it has been standard practice not to ,award the wife more than
$50.00 per month per child where the financial circumstances are simillar to those of the parties.
We earnestly submit that, if plaintiff were a
fit person to have the custody of the children, un'der
no circumstances should she be awarded more th~an
$50.00 per month per child for support.
The home and the household furnishings and
fixtures, together with the life insurance on the life
of defendant, represent substantially all of the
worldly accumulations of the parties. If the defendant is awarded custody of the minor children, in
view of plaintiff's misconduct, defendant should be
awarded the home and the household furnishings
and fixtures. If it were assumed for purposes of
argument only that plaintiff is a fit person to have
the custody of the children, then in such event plaintiff should not be awarded more than a one-half
interest in the home, ,and the home should be ordered
sold under the supervision of the court at such time
as both children have attained the age of majority
and the proceeds should be divided equally between
the parties. Plaintiff in the interim should be required to make the monthly payments on the home
and not be entitled to credit therefor because she
is living in the home of the defendant fraudulently.
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POINT 3.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
PLAINTIFF $1.00 PER YEAR ALIMONY AND $7'50.00
ATTORNEYS FEES.

The effect of the trial court's decree is to actually reward a parent for adultery, dissipation, immorality, negle~t of the parent's children and an
utter lack of any regard for the S'anctity of marriage. But, in the face of the admitted facts that
plaintiff falsely and fraudulently instituted and
maintained this divorce action for the purpose of
carrying on an immoral relationship with a married man, to award plaintiff $750.00 attorneys fees
to assist her in so doing is absolutely unconscionable.
The same is true of the $1.00 per year alimony.
It is no answer to say that the award of $1.00 per
year alimony to plaintiff is of no consequen·ce. It
is apparent from her record of immorality an·d dishonesty that she will hold this over defendant's
head for the rest of his life.
Furthermore the record in the case before the
court shows the following. The sworn complaint,
upon which the restraining order issued causing
defendant to be thrown out of his home, expressly
set forth that defendant had beaten his wife on
m·any occasions. It was subscribed and sworn to by
plaintiff before her attor11ey, Mr. McCullough, acting as a notary public. The verification expressly
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set forth that the plaintiff appeared before McCullough and swore under oath that she had read the
complaint, knew its contents and the same was
true. Plaintiff admitted at trial tha:t defendant had
never be·aten her and explained that she had signed
the complaint without reading it. It was incumbent
upon plaintiff to read the complaint and see that
its contents were correct. As a result plaintiff has
caused defendant to be maliciously libeled .and a
public record to be mlade to the effect that Mr. McBroom is a wife beater.
In si'tua:tions where the misconduct of the wife
was far less reprehensilble th·an 'that in the case
before this court, the Su·preme Cou1t has denied
the wife any alimony ·and has refused to allow her
any attorneys fees. See, Holm v. Holm (1914) 44 U.
242, 139 P. 937; and, Gr~aziano v. Graziano (1958)
7 U.2d 187, 321 P.2d 931.
The italics ~are 'by the writer.
Respectfully submitted,
McBROOM & HYDE
401 El Paso Natural Gas Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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